Clash of Emotions: White House—State Department Relations during the Kennedy Administration by Rasmussen, Kasper Grotle
Clash of Emotions: White 
House—State Department 
 Relations during the Kennedy 
Administration
Kasper Grotle Rasmussen
University of Southern Denmark
Abstract: This article examines the rather poor emotional relationship between the 
White House and the State Department during 1961, the first year of the presidency of 
John F. Kennedy. The article argues that both sides had expectations of the relation-
ship that turned into disappointments and that both sides felt that their approach and 
work was superior to the other. During the Berlin Crisis, this clash of emotions gained 
political significance concerning the case of the American response to a Soviet formal 
diplomatic note (an aide-mémoire) following the June 1961 Vienna Summit between 
Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. The White House and the State De-
partment had different priorities and because of the poor emotional relationship they 
failed to find common ground. The end result was that the State Department won the 
battle by having its preferred version of the response sent to the Soviets. But the De-
partment lost the war, because the White House used the opportunity to take control 
of Berlin policy at the expense of the State Department.  
Keywords: John F. Kennedy, History of American Foreign Relations, History of Emo-
tions, Berlin Crisis, Cold War 
“What’s wrong with that god dam department of yours, Chip?”, President 
John F. Kennedy asked Charles “Chip” Bohlen, a high-ranking State De-
partment officer and among the foremost Soviet experts in the US govern-
ment, in 1961. Bohlen – who was one of the few State Department officers 
to enjoy good relations with the Kennedy White House – replied that it was 
the President himself who embodied the problem due to the penchant of 
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Kennedy and his inner circle for meddling in State Department affairs and 
circumventing its authority.1 In the same vein, a clearly frustrated Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk told his Executive Secretary Lucius D. Battle: “The 
White House is all over this building. Papers are going from here to there 
without going through the Seventh Floor. We don’t know what is going on. 
Try to get a handle on it…”2
The tension between the two institutions is well-documented and is part 
of the story of the Kennedy years in the early 1960s. The crux of the matter 
is as follows: An activist president perceiving his State Department to be 
conservative and incapable of innovation took control of foreign policy by 
way of National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and the National Se-
curity Council (NSC) staff, which he used as a personal foreign policy unit 
that ultimately allowed Kennedy to serve as what Averell Harriman, an old 
foreign policy hand, and others have called “his own Secretary of State.”3
Reflecting on this tension in 1971, former Secretary of State in the Tru-
man Administration, Dean Acheson, noted that beginning with the Kenne-
dy Administration, this process of supplanting the State Department contin-
ued and expanded through the 1960s. On that note he wondered musingly: 
“What emotions they stirred in the breasts of their colleagues at the State 
Department we must wait on future memoirs to learn. Meanwhile, we can 
imagine that there has been strain.”4
This article takes up Acheson’s musings and examines the institutional re-
lationship between the White House and the State Department during the 
Kennedy Administration from an emotional perspective. What was the nature 
of the emotional strain in the State Department? Which emotions were at the 
1 Charles E. Bohlen Oral History Interview, 1964, John F. Kennedy Library, 33.
2 Lucius D. Battle Oral History Interview, 1991, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, For-
eign Affairs Oral History Project, 16 (www.adst.org). The Seventh Floor of the State Department was 
where the Department leadership was located. 
3 W. Averell Harriman Oral History Interview #2, 1965, John F. Kennedy Library, 70. Cf. e.g. Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Com-
pany, 2002 (1965)), 406ff.; I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of 
Organizational Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 95-104;  Lawrence Freedman, Ken-
nedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 37, 65; Andrew 
Preston, The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2006), 36; Ivo H. Daalder and I. M. Destler, In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the Na-
tional Security Advisers and the Presidents They Served – From JFK to George W. Bush (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 2009), 19.
4 Dean Acheson, “The Eclipse of the State Department”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 49, no. 4 (July 1971), 603.
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heart of White House actions and how did the clash of these emotions help 
cause the discord between the two institutions and its leading members? And, 
more tentatively, did these emotional aspects have any effect on policy?
In sketching out the emotional underpinnings of White House-State De-
partment relations, the article focuses on events and developments during 
the Administration’s inaugural year of 1961. This was arguably the time 
when the emotional relationship between the two was at its lowest point 
and the NSC staff led the charge on the White House side. Staff member 
Michael Forrestal, who joined the Administration in 1962, speculates that 
in 1961 it was a “very powerful kind of staff that may have gone much fur-
ther than I ever would have gone in attempting to impose their will or the 
President’s will on the Departments.”5
First of all, the article argues that both sides came to the relationship 
with a number of expectations that were not met and consequently led to 
disappointment. Secondly, both sides were convinced of their own self-
worth and superiority in matters of policy and process, which in turn led to 
accusations of inferiority against the other side. Thirdly, the poor relations 
between the two institutions was made abundantly clear when the Berlin 
crisis was re-ignited in the summer of 1961. The case under examination 
here – the American response to the Soviet aide-mémoire reaffirming So-
viet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s ultimatum regarding the status of Berlin 
– contained the entire spectrum of emotional clash between the two actors. 
The White House became so exasperated with the Department that even 
though the final version followed the State Department line, it was a Pyrrhic 
victory, which served only as a further source of discord between the two 
and yet another reason for the White House to want to control the policy 
process at the expense of the State Department.
A final note must be made on the nature of WH-State relations during the 
Kennedy years. While it is true that the state of the relationship was often 
acrimonious, it never reached the point of animosity and suspicion of the 
Nixon-Kissinger tenure a decade later.6 Personal relations between indi-
vidual actors were often collegial - depending on the people involved – and 
the White House neither sought nor assumed full control.7  
5 Michael V. Forrestal Oral History #1, 1964, JFK Library, 58.
6 Daalder & Destler, In the Shadow of the Oval Office, 93.
7 Robert Komer Oral History Interview #5, 1969, JFKL, 12, 23-24.
22 American Studies in Scandinavia, 49:1
Emotions as a Category of Analysis in American Foreign Relations
Emotions are a vital and important part of the history of human interac-
tion and must be acknowledged as such. For some, this will require a “leap 
of faith”, due to the fact that emotions can seem hard to detect and even 
harder to manage analytically.8 Others will be more easily persuaded by the 
seemingly simple maxims of historian Barbara Keys, who in her analysis 
of Henry Kissinger argues that “we are all influenced by emotion in funda-
mental and sometimes decisive ways. Even the most Herculean efforts to 
insulate policy choices from sentiment are doomed to failure”. Keys further 
argues that: “Cognition is profoundly influenced by feelings. The reverse is 
also true: emotions require an assessment of relevance and effects; hence, 
emotion is often shaped by cognition.”9
Keys’ emphasis of the reciprocal relationship between cognition and 
emotion is important, because emotion should rightly be seen as an added 
layer of complexity and explanation rather than a smoking gun-type expla-
nation where world leaders or important aides are reduced to their emo-
tional reactions without a larger, multi-faceted explanatory framework. 
In examining the White House-State Department relationship, this article 
thus looks for signs of emotional expressions. The source material is drawn 
from oral history interviews, in which participants were specifically asked 
about how events and developments affected them, memoirs by selected ac-
tors as well as some unpublished memoranda and correspondence from the 
John F. Kennedy Library and the National Archives. Regarding oral history 
interviews and memoirs, the historian must of course be careful in trusting 
these sources, because in later recollection there can be a tendency towards 
inflation of the subject’s own importance, the degradation of memory as 
well as the possibility of later events influencing the memory of an emotion 
so as to skew the perception of the actual emotion experienced in the period 
under investigation.10 
The use of contemporary material also presents challenges, because one 
of the characteristics of emotional life and emotional norms in the Kennedy 
8 I am indebted to Dr. Maria Ryan (University of Nottingham), who suggested this phrase during a panel at 
the 2016 American Politics Group conference in Reading, United Kingdom.
9 Barbara Keys, “Henry Kissinger: The Emotional Statesman”, Diplomatic History, vol. 35, no. 4 (Septem-
ber 2011), 591.
10 Cf. e.g. Jan Plamper, The History of Emotions: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
290.
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Administration was a dislike of overt displays of emotion. Here, then, we 
must follow historian Barbara Rosenwein’s suggestion to “[r]ead the si-
lences” and carefully employ historical inference to suggest plausible emo-
tional activity based on worldview and context.11
   
Research on the History of Emotions 
Research on emotions often takes as point of departure the debate between 
universalists and constructivists, the central point of which revolves around 
the notion of whether emotions do or do not have a history. Universal-
ists, mostly neuroscientists and psychologists, argue that emotions are by 
and large constant across time and space, whether observed through facial 
micro expressions or fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) brain 
scans.12
On the other side of the debate we find constructivists, who view emo-
tions as mainly socially and culturally constructed. This approach to emo-
tions research has generally been strongest in the human sciences, where 
anthropologists, for instance, have identified culturally distinct emotions 
around the world, arguing thus that emotions can best be explained as being 
socially constructed.13 
Historians, too, tend to belong to the constructivist camp, because they 
believe that the emotions people have experienced and expressed through 
history are not constant, but contingent upon different cultures, norms, lan-
guages, relationships and perceptions of the world. That being said, I join 
Susan J. Matt in her assessment that many historians occupy some ver-
sion of the middle ground between universalists and constructivists, where 
“feelings are never strictly biological or chemical occurrences; neither are 
they wholly shaped by language and society.”14 The middle ground, how-
ever, does have a constructivist preference.
11 Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions”, Passions in Context, vol. 1, 
no. 1, 2010, 17.
12 Paul Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen, “Constants Across Cultures in the Face and Emotion”, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 17, no. 2, 1971; Elizabeth J. Carter & Kevin A. Pelphrey, “Friend 
or Foe? Brain Systems Involved in the Perception of Dynamic Signals of Menacing and Friendly Social 
Approaches”, Social Neuroscience, vol. 3, no. 2, 2008.
13 For a good overview of the research, see Plamper, The History of Emotions, 75-146.
14 Susan J. Matt, “Current Emotion Research in History: Or, Doing History from the Inside Out”, Emotion 
Review, vol. 3, no. 1 (January 2011), 118.
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The history of emotions traces its roots to Europe in the first half of the 
twentieth century.15 Now classical works by scholars such as German his-
torical sociologist Norbert Elias and French historian Lucien Febvre exam-
ined emotional life in the Middle Ages and called for a concerted efforts by 
historians and social scientists to examine the emotional life of the past.16
After a period of hiatus, three American historians, Peter Stearns, William 
Reddy and Barbara Rosenwein, took up the mantle of emotions history from 
the 1980s onwards and developed analyses using innovative methodological 
and theoretical perspectives. Stearns developed the notion of emotionology 
in the 1980s, which dealt with societal emotional norms.17 Reddy followed 
suit in the 1990s by arguing that emotions could be studied by their spoken 
expressions, which Reddy called emotives.18 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
Rosenwein presented the notion of emotional community – grouping historical 
actors together by shared emotions. An emotional community can be described 
as the same as other forms of social communities, such as families, churches, 
medieval princely courts and presidential administrations and the goal is to 
examine shared emotions, emotional practices and emotional norms.19
Traditionally, the integration of emotions as an analytical element into the 
historical study of US foreign policy has not been commonplace. Realist his-
torians have looked to the rational acts of rational men who cared about the 
national interest. Revisionist historians have focused on economic motives 
and the furthering of American capitalism as a significant driving force. Even 
those historians who have taken an interest in the role of ideas have tended to 
focus on the rational and non-emotive side of their subject matter. Recently, 
however, historians have increasingly looked at other aspects of American 
foreign policy, such as gender, race, culture and emotions – and have ex-
panded and rebranded the subject matter as American foreign relations.20 
15 For a good overview of the history of emotions both before and after this time, see Plamper, The History of 
Emotions, 40-74.
16 References are to the English translations published somewhat later than the original works. Norbert Elias, 
The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
2000); Lucien Febvre, “Sensibility and History: How to Reconstitute the Emotional Life of the Past” in 
Peter Burke (ed.), A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). 
17 Peter N. Stearns with Carol Z. Stearns, “Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional 
Standards”, The American Historical Review, vol. 90, no. 4 (October 1985), 813-836.
18 William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
19 Rosenwein “Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions”, 11. 
20 For a good overview of historiographical trends, cf. Frank Costigliola and Thomas G. Paterson “Defining 
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Very few historians have written about emotional aspects of American 
foreign relations. Frank Costigliola, who has helped shape the field, has ar-
gued that not only are emotions important for a full understanding of events 
and causation, but they are in fact vital.21 Costigliola further argues, in a 
1997 article on diplomat George F. Kennan, that in order to demonstrate 
this connection, historians need to carefully examine language, which is 
“neither transparent nor value-free” and which can “emotionalize and con-
dition the interpretation…”22 The approach of Costigliola is thus a signifi-
cant inspiration to this article.
Emotions: Clash and Misunderstanding
President Kennedy entered office without a grand strategic plan for American 
foreign policy. It was not that he did not have visions – a change in East-West 
relations, more focus on the Third World and a reduced reliance on nuclear 
weapons, but he did not have a strategy in place. He did, however, have a clear 
view about his Administration’s approach to foreign policy. He wanted action 
and innovation to be guiding parameters, not conservatism and traditionalism. 
His was the era of the New Frontier; the old ways simply would no longer do.23
Kennedy seems to have been convinced from the outset that the State 
Department was a major proponent of the traditional approach to foreign 
policy from which he sought to escape. But while his expectations of State’s 
ability and willingness to participate in foreign policy-making in the new 
regime were low, this did not mean that he did not envision it to play a 
significant role. But in order to do so, new people and a new way of doing 
things were required both at State and at the White House.24 
Kennedy’s rather slim electoral victory coupled with his desire to re-
ward the people who had helped him obtain it and his desire to exercise 
and Doing the History of American Foreign Relations: A Primer”, in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. 
Paterson (eds.), Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2nd edition, 2004).
21 See e.g. Frank Costigliola, “Reading for Meaning: Theory, Language and Metaphor”, in Hogan and Pa-
terson, Explaining American Foreign Relations, 2004; idem, Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances: How Personal 
Politics Helped Start the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).  
22 Frank Costigliola, “’Unceasing Pressure for Penetration’: Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Ken-
nan’s Formation of the Cold War”, Journal of American History, vol. 83, no. 4 (March 1997), 1309.
23 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 34.
24 Robert Dallek, Camelot’s Court: Inside the Kennedy White House (New York: HarperCollins, 2013), 89-95.
26 American Studies in Scandinavia, 49:1
control over appointments, played a not insignificant role in his political 
appointments at the State Department. He set up an unofficial committee 
headed by his brother-in-law Sargent Shriver to gather names and interview 
the people. The progressive wing of the Democratic Party was hoping that 
Kennedy would appoint Adlai Stevenson – who had lost presidential elec-
tions to Dwight D. Eisenhower twice – as Secretary of State, but because he 
had failed to deliver early support for Kennedy’s campaign, he would have 
to settle for the ambassadorship to the United Nations. Stevenson’s close 
associate, Chester Bowles, on the other hand, had signed on to the New 
Frontier at an early stage and served as foreign policy advisor to the cam-
paign. For his efforts, he was appointed Under Secretary of State, which 
was the number two job in the Department.25 
Dean Rusk had not yet been appointed Secretary of State when the se-
lection of his two high profile subordinates was announced. Chip Bohlen 
recalls having felt that Kennedy “presented Mr. Rusk with an almost impos-
sible [task] by appointing two of his subordinates before he had selected 
him.”26 Rusk, however, writes in his memoirs that he asked the President 
to appoint both Stevenson and Bowles and thus offers an alternative narra-
tive.27 As Rusk is the only one to champion this particular version of event, 
the more plausible explanation might be that their appointments did indeed 
bother Rusk and out of sheer embarrassment, he seized the opportunity to 
try to influence the perception of history.   
Rusk was not Kennedy’s first choice for Secretary of State. It was ini-
tially offered to moderate Republican Robert Lovett, a former Defense Sec-
retary, Under Secretary of State and Wall Street banker, but he turned down 
all offers of Cabinet posts (he was also offered Defense and Treasury). 
There would have been significant political upside to having a Republican 
in the Cabinet, especially one as formidable as Lovett, but he instead sug-
gested Rusk for State (moderate Democrat) and the head of the Ford Motor 
Company, Robert McNamara (moderate Republican) for Defense. Before 
accepting Rusk, Kennedy attempted to recruit William Fulbright, the Dem-
ocratic senator from Arkansas, for the job, but ultimately had to give up on 
him, because Fulbright had signed the so-called Southern Manifesto against 
racial integration and might thereby create difficulties for New Frontier di-
25 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 35-36.
26 Charles E. Bohlen Oral History Interview, 1964, JFKL, 33.
27 Rusk, As I Saw It, 204-05.
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plomacy in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. Thus the choice fell on 
Rusk, who was not particularly popular with the White House staff – Arthur 
Schlesinger felt that Rusk represented “the lowest common denominator.”28
Kennedy and the White House continued to try and control appointments 
at State after Rusk had been chosen. It created the same kind of resentment, 
but White House efforts were not always successful. Kennedy managed 
to push through appointments such as Roger Hilsman as Director of Intel-
ligence and Research (INR) at State over Rusk’s objections, but did not 
manage to circumvent the Secretary and place either McGeorge Bundy or 
Walt Rostow at the Department.29 To Rusk and much of the Foreign Service 
in the Department, the message seemed clear: State must serve and imple-
ment the New Frontier policy line, but Kennedy representatives are needed 
to make sure the Department performs as scheduled.
The greatest structural change, however, came at the White House. In 
order to play the role of his own secretary of state, Kennedy needed his own 
organization to provide him with foreign policy analysis and advice, and 
on whose loyalty he could depend. He consequently reorganized the staff 
of the National Security Council (NSC) for these purposes. Originally, the 
staff was an administrative support unit for the National Security Council 
– created by the National Security Act of 1947 with the intention of co-
ordinating the diplomatic and military aspects of national security policy. 
The staff pushed around papers and tried to iron out differences between 
the State Department – the major bureaucratic player in the Truman and 
Eisenhower Administrations – and the Defense Department, the CIA and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But in the Kennedy Administration, however, the 
President wanted to play a role independent of his professional diplomats at 
State and, consequently, the NSC staff was transformed into a presidential 
foreign policy staff that worked to strengthen the presidency and to repre-
sent presidential views throughout the Administration.30 
Harvard Dean McGeorge Bundy was chosen as special assistant to the 
President for national security affairs – the job more commonly known 
28 Dallek, Camelot’s Court, 83-85; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Journals: 1952-2000 (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2008), 98.
29 Roger Hilsman Oral History Interview #1, 1970, JFKL, 3.
30 Cf. Anna K. Nelson, “The Evolution of the National Security State” in Andrew Bacevich (ed.), The Long 
War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007).
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as the national security advisor. Bundy, who only knew Kennedy slightly 
from social circles, was a Boston Brahmin and born into the East Coast 
Establishment. Bundy’s father had worked for former Secretary of War and 
State Henry Stimson, who was often seen as the very embodiment of the 
bipartisan foreign policy Establishment, and Bundy himself had co-written 
Stimson’s memoirs. Bundy had made a name for himself as an academic 
star on the rise: one of the youngest tenured professors in the Government 
Department (though lacking a PhD degree), the youngest dean of Arts and 
Sciences at Harvard – sharp, quick, acerbic and brilliant. Walt W. Rostow 
– a development economist from MIT, who had been somewhat active in 
the presidential campaign – was chosen as Bundy’s deputy. Together they 
brought in a team of so-called “action-intellectuals”, such as Robert Komer 
of the CIA and Carl Kaysen from Harvard, to support the president in his 
efforts.31
The new NSC staff immediately went to work strengthening Kennedy’s 
role in foreign affairs. The staff effectively became a “little State Depart-
ment” with staffers acquiring regional expertise and becoming intimately 
familiar with the ins and outs of the most important policy areas.32 Coupled 
with access to raw cable traffic from posts around the world, which ex-CIA 
officer Robert Komer managed to negotiate through his former employer 
(who controlled the hardware), this enabled the staff to provide Kennedy 
with information and often alternative analyses and advice based on reli-
able intelligence, which strengthened the role of the White House and re-
duced its reliance on State, Defense and the CIA.33
It seems reasonably clear that the reorganization of the NSC staff and the 
early appointment of State Department leadership increased the friction be-
tween the White House and the State Department. Even before the collabo-
ration had begun, State Department expectations had been disappointed, 
because the signal from the White House was not an invitation to join the 
New Frontier, but rather a decree to follow in its footsteps.
It seems, however, that a significant reason for State Department disap-
pointment – especially prevalent among members of the Foreign Service – 
was that many of them had been excited about the New Frontier and many 
31 Daalder & Destler, In the Shadows of the Oval Office, 16-18.
32 Cf. Andrew Preston, “The Little State Department: McGeorge Bundy and the National Security Council 
Staff, 1961-1965”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 31, no. 4 (December 2001)
33 Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, 29 April, 1961, Box 321, NSF, JFKL. 
29CLASH OF EMOTIONS
had voted for JFK. Executive Secretary Lucius Battle remembers that “[e]
veryone wanted to be part of what was a very exciting thing, the New Fron-
tier. There was the greatest sense of exhilaration in the Department of State 
and in the city of Washington.”34 State Department officers consequently 
experienced a feeling of disconnect and had difficulty reconciling the aspi-
ration and expectation of the New Frontier with the reality of the Kennedy 
Administration. 
Kennedy expected leadership from the State Department (within the 
framework set up by him and his White House advisors), but he tended to 
be disappointed. According to Schlesinger, Kennedy complained: “They 
never have any ideas over there [and they] never come up with anything 
new.”35 Why were State Department officers so reluctant to exhibit leader-
ship in foreign affairs? Here it seems that we can point to at least two rea-
sons for White House disappointment. First of all, past experiences played 
a significant role in shaping patterns of action, thought and feeling in the 
Department of State. Throughout the 1950s, the professional Foreign Ser-
vice had been exposed to a great deal of mistrust from central figures, most 
notably Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wisconsin) and its own Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles. The Department’s Executive Secretary Lucius 
Battle remembers that the McCarthy Era of the early 1950s had a “devas-
tating effect on morale.”36 McCarthy’s presentation of an infamous list of 
205 named State Department officials, who were allegedly members of the 
Communist Party, intensified the hunt for traitors, spies and fellow travel-
lers in the American government. The list and the number, of course, were 
exaggerations, but did manage to create mistrust and disruption in the State 
Department and bring about the dismissal of the so-called China hands, 
such as John Carter Vincent and John Service, who were especially accused 
of “losing China” after the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 
1949.37 
In 1953, when Chip Bohlen – whom we met in the beginning of this 
article – was nominated to be the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 
McCarthyites tried to mount sufficient opposition to block his nomina-
34 Lucius D. Battle Oral History Interview #1, 1968, JFKL, 5
35 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 406.
36 Ibid., 4.
37 Kenneth Weisbrode, The Atlantic Century: Four Generations of Extraordinary Diplomats Who Forged 
America’s Vital Alliance With Europe (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2009), 141.
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tion, mainly because he had served as President Roosevelt’s translator at 
the Yalta Conference in 1945 and was thus blamed for accepting Soviet 
control over Eastern Europe. President Eisenhower stuck by him and he 
was eventually confirmed, but this support was not shared by Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles, who would not fight for Bohlen - one of the 
few Foreign Service officers to achieve the rank of Ambassador and thus 
a role model to his colleagues. This incident proved a general exemplar of 
the relationship between Dulles and the Department. Lucius Battle recalls 
that the Secretary, “…was not a person who used the Foreign Service. He 
distrusted it completely, and had very little to do with it. The continuation 
of the McCarthy era plus the Dulles era had pretty well shaken the self-
confidence that the Service had”.38 
The second reason for White House disappointment lay in the nature of 
the expectation. Kennedy and the White House wanted the State Department 
to fill out a foreign policy framework when it was clear that the Department 
took issue with several core elements of that framework, such as urgency, 
innovation and pragmatism. Chip Bohlen remembers trying to explain to the 
President that “foreign affairs did not make possible quick, snap answers in 
regard to any question of importance…”, because the repercussions of any 
important issue were invariably consequential not only for the United States, 
but also for its allies and the rest of the world.39 This, according to State De-
partment tradition, was a central tenet of the diplomatic craft. 
The President and his inner circle did not appreciate State’s penchant for 
the slow, diligent approach to foreign affairs. In the summer of 1961 – in 
the midst of the Berlin Crisis – he portrayed the Department as a “bowl 
of jelly”, saying: “It’s got all those people over there who are constantly 
smiling. I think we need to smile less and be tougher.”40 As we shall see 
regarding the case of the American response to the Soviet aide-mémoire, 
this created severe discord between the two institutions. 
Response to the Soviet Aide-Mémoire: 
The clash of emotions in White House-State Department relations gained 
policy implications during the summer of 1961 when the Berlin Crisis was 
38 Lucius D. Battle Oral History Interview #1, 1968, JFKL, 4. 
39 Charles E. Bohlen Oral History Interview, 1964, JFKL, 32.
40 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 406.
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re-activated following the June Vienna Summit between Kennedy and his 
Soviet counterpart Nikita Khrushchev. At the end of the summit, which was 
supposed to improve relations between the two countries, but in fact ended 
on a particular sour note with talk of war and conflict, Khrushchev handed 
the President a document recapturing the Soviet position – known as an 
aide-mémoire. Crafting an American response to this document became a 
battleground between the White House and the State Department, in which 
all of the emotional components – expectation, disappointment, feelings of 
superiority and accusations of inferiority – were activated.
Berlin was the European hotspot during the early phase of the Cold War 
and was in many ways representative of the East-West conflict itself. Like 
Germany itself, the former capital had been divided into four zones of oc-
cupation controlled by France, Great Britain, the United States and the So-
viet Union. In theory, both Germany and Berlin were to be treated as single 
occupied entities, but it soon became clear that each occupying force would 
make up its own rules.41 
This became exceedingly apparent in the first crisis over Berlin in 1948-
49. The Western Allies merged their zones of occupation with the added 
intent of making a new, strong West German currency. The much smaller 
Soviet zone would be completely outmatched, but it had one strong card 
left to play: it was home to Berlin and it controlled the ground access routes, 
which Soviet authorities blockaded. The Western part of Berlin could not 
survive in isolation and the Allies created an air bridge to the city with sup-
plies, which the Soviets did not interrupt for fear of escalation into a new 
war in which the United States still possessed a monopoly on the nuclear 
weapon.42 Once it became clear that the Soviet blockade was not a deter-
rence to Western action, it was lifted. Both sides proclaimed the creation 
of “their” Germany – the Federal Republic of Germany in the West and 
the German Democratic Republic in the East – and NATO, the defensive 
transatlantic alliance, was formed. The Cold War now seemed a tangible 
reality.43
For much of the 1950s, East-West confrontation centered on other ar-
eas than Berlin. But in late 1958, crisis erupted anew. Soviet leader Ni-
41 Hans-Peter Schwartz: “The division of Germany” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. 1 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 138-39.
42 Ernest R. May, “America’s Berlin”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 4 (July/August 1998), 149-150.
43 Schwarz, “The division of Germany”, 149. 
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kita Khrushchev demanded that the Western allies sign a World War II 
peace treaty with Germany and that Western forces vacate Berlin within 
six months – otherwise he would turn over all Soviet responsibilities to the 
East German government.44 This represented a problem for the West and 
especially the United States, because they did not recognize the East Ger-
man government as the country’s legitimate authority. This was very much 
a courtesy to West Germany, whose so-called Hallstein Doctrine prohibited 
the FRG from recognizing any country that also recognized the GDR (save 
for the Soviet Union from the mid-1950s). The US also did not want to ac-
cept the current Oder-Neisse line as the final border between East Germany 
and Poland, which had effectively moved Poland to the West so as to cre-
ate even more of a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and Germany. 
This was also out of deference to West Germany, whose leaders imagined 
a future merger between the two Germanies and did not want to give up 
German territory.45
The Eisenhower Administration was not inclined to immediately give up 
its position, but instead invited Khrushchev to the United States, which he 
accepted. For part of 1959, a so-called “spirit of Camp David” reigned in 
the US-Soviet relationship and Khrushchev withdrew the 1958 ultimatum. 
Substantial discussion would take place in the following year at a meet-
ing in Paris between representatives from the US, the USSR, Britain and 
France. The Paris Summit, however, was derailed by the Soviet downing of 
an American U2 spy plane about two weeks before the summit was sched-
uled to start in May of 1960 and Khrushchev expressed his desire to await 
the election of his American counterpart in the fall before revisiting the is-
sue of Berlin in international politics.46
Kennedy’s election did not precipitate immediate American action. Rath-
er Kennedy was happy to let Khrushchev make the first move, because 
while the Americans could live with the status quo, the Soviets felt that 
change was necessary. The two leaders agreed to meet in the Austrian capi-
tal of Vienna in early June for a summit about common problems, including 
disarmament, the neutralization of Laos and, of course, Berlin. From an 
American perspective, the Vienna Summit was a failure. Kennedy’s agenda 
44 May, “America’s Berlin”, 152.
45 Melvyn Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union and the Cold War (New 
York: Hill Wang, 2007), 235.
46 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 58-59.
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was to move ahead on nuclear disarmament or a test ban, while Khrush-
chev wanted a solution to the Berlin question as a prerequisite for joint 
nuclear ventures. They found common ground on Laos, but the tone of the 
exchanges between the two leaders became shrill and ideological. Khrush-
chev might have believed that he could rattle an inexperienced American 
president and, following the ill-fated US-supported invasion of the Bay of 
Pigs in Cuba in mid-April, the Soviet leader probably also believed that 
Kennedy would buckle under pressure.47 Khrushchev handed Kennedy an 
aide-mémoire restating the terms of the 1958 ultimatum: leave Berlin with-
in six months or negotiate a new agreement with the German Democratic 
Republic.48 A few days later, on 10 June, the Soviets made the document 
public, which increased the pressure on the American side for a quick reso-
lution to the crisis.49 
The State Department was given the task of writing a response to the 
Soviet aide-mémoire and it was handled by the Office of German Affairs 
under the auspices of its director, Martin Hillenbrand, and ultimately As-
sistant Secretary for Europe Foy Kohler and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. 
From the outset, the White House and the Department had, it seems safe 
to assume, very different expectations about the direction, content and ap-
plication of the American response. The White House preferred a political 
approach that would help counteract Soviet intentions and actions with 
regard to Berlin. In order for that avenue to work, the aide-mémoire would 
need to be a document, which presented a bold and innovative American 
position that took a marked departure from past policy – though without 
abandoning the American position in Berlin. The State Department, on 
the other hand, preferred what can be termed a traditional and legalistic 
approach, which re-iterated the American policy from the 1958-59 crisis 
of maintaining the status quo. This position was also one that was agreed 
to by the Western Allies, France, the United Kingdom and West Germany, 
and the Department put heavy emphasis on inter-Allied consultation and 
agreement.50
47 Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 221.
48 “Soviet Aide-Mémoire, Berlin-Germany”, 4 June 1961, Berlin Crisis Documents, 1961, Box 1, RG59-
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Within this atmosphere of differing expectations, the State Department 
began the drafting process. In an oral history interview from 1964, Hillen-
brand reflected on both the tension and State’s drafting process: 
I think it is also fair to say that… some of the President’s new team felt that there must be 
some new solution to the Berlin problem which could be pulled out of the hat and which a 
new administration, obviously possessed of a great deal of collective intelligence, would 
be able to devise. Our feeling in State, of course, was that there were no easy solutions to 
the Berlin problem, and our recommendations were along those lines.51 
Hillenbrand and his colleagues had made no secret of this approach. In the 
early spring, Hillenbrand had been asked to write an analysis of the Berlin 
Crisis for the White House and possible American action, in which he made 
clear that he felt no change was advisable in the Administration’s position.52 
Hillenbrand clearly felt that the State Department approach – tried and test-
ed and carried out by seasoned professionals – was superior to that of his 
White House colleagues. When the first draft was received by the White 
House on 10 June this feeling was not mutual. McGeorge Bundy presented 
the draft to the President in a memo calling it
a pretty good document, of its kind. It is right in the tradition of arguments on our side, 
and it would probably be persuasive to those who have tended to agree with us in the 
past. It is well worth study. Except for the reiteration of the Western Peace Plan of May 
14, 1959, it contains no affirmative proposals, but the exception is a substantial one.53  
Bundy continued his memo to Kennedy by referring to a policy analysis by 
Henry Kissinger, (Nixon’s National Security Advisor, who at that time was 
serving as a consultant to the NSC staff), which Bundy called “a powerful 
document setting forth a strong line on Germany.”54
Bundy’s 10 June memo, while written in what might be considered un-
emotional language, can nevertheless provide insight into the emotions of 
Bundy and the people of the White House. First of all, while Bundy was 
seemingly not dismissive of the State Department draft, he emphasized the 
fact that the document was not presenting any new ideas – and hardly any 
51 Martin J. Hillenbrand Oral History Interview #1, JFKL, 1964, 3.
52 Martin J. Hillenbrand, ”The Problem of Berlin”, undated, Hillenbrand Files, Box 2, Lot 84 F 53, RG 59 
631/58/6/3-5, National Archives II.
53 Bundy to Kennedy, “Berlin”, 10 June, 1961, Box 405, NSF, JFKL.
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“affirmative proposals”. New and affirmative proposals, of course, had been 
part of the White House mandate to State’s drafting process, which meant 
that behind the appearance of praise, Bundy was in fact criticizing the docu-
ment. Secondly, feelings of superiority were also displayed here, as Bundy 
juxtaposed the draft response to Kissinger’s “powerful document”. He did 
not fully agree with Kissinger’s writings, because he found them too activist 
and militaristic in their push for German unification, but nevertheless still 
held them in higher regard, because of their innovative and non-traditionalist 
character, than he did State’s draft response to the Soviet aide-mémoire.
From the time Nikita Khrushchev handed John F. Kennedy the Sovi-
et aide-mémoire in Vienna on 4 June almost six weeks elapsed before it 
was finally sent to the Soviets on 18 July. The White House, having as-
sumed that this would be a rather speedy affair that could quickly present 
the American case to the Soviets and to the world, was disappointed in 
the delay and blamed the State Department. On 10 July, Kennedy dictated 
memo to Bundy in which he deplored the delay and the State’s handling of 
the draft response:
As you may know, Secretary Rusk called me yesterday and told me the Aide Memoire 
answer was going to be put off until next week again. It has taken us more than six weeks 
to answer an Aide Memoire, which merely restates our past position. This is lamentable. 
Would you ask the State Department to give us an actual log on the Aide Memoire, when 
we got the first draft, when we first consulted on it, how many meetings, and all the rest. 
If we can’t speed up the procedures on this sort of thing how are we ever going to speed 
them up on the really important consultations.55
Kennedy’s memo point to three interesting aspects. First of all, it seems 
clear that the White House did not see the aide-mémoire as the most impor-
tant element of crisis planning as evidenced in the final part of the quote. 
Concurrently with the process of answering the Soviet message, a Berlin 
Task Force was set up under State Department leadership to handle day-to-
day planning, but the White House felt that that task force was being ne-
glected in favor of work on the aide-mémoire. Arthur Schlesinger argues in 
his memoir/history of the Kennedy Presidency that “[n]o one in the White 
House, least of all the President, would ever understand why this not very 
exacting assignment proved so difficult.”56 The White House clearly felt 
55 Kennedy to Bundy, 10 July 1961, Box 62, POF, JFKL.
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that State’s handling of the process – the legalistic approach with its focus 
on inter-Allied consultation and the importance of protocol – was wrong 
and was disappointed that State did not finish the response sooner so the 
more important part of planning for the Berlin Crisis could get underway.
Secondly, the very question of the delay in finishing the draft response is 
interesting regarding the emotional relationship between the White House 
and the State Department. Kennedy called the delay “lamentable” and di-
rected Bundy to obtain a chronological account of the process from the 
Department. Seemingly, he was disappointed and seriously dismayed by 
the delay. The State Department at the time could do nothing but take the 
blame, but would fight back in due course through memoirs in the hope that 
historical interpretations would right the wrong.
This counter-narrative originated with Martin Hillenbrand, who put it 
in his own 1998 memoirs, and with Rusk – to whom Hillenbrand relayed 
his version – who put it in his memoirs from 1991. Hillenbrand claimed 
that it was the White House and not the State Department that was indeed 
responsible for the delay in finishing the aide-mémoire. After sending over 
yet another draft in mid-June, Hillenbrand argued, the White House lost or 
misplaced it: “What had actually happened, we later learned, was that our 
draft had ended up in the safe of Ralph Dungan, a presidential assistant, 
to which he alone had the combination. He then went off on a two-week 
holiday.”57 This counter-narrative has been picked up by scholars, who 
joined Hillenbrand in concluding that this issue was indeed the major cause 
of the delay.58
Hillenbrand’s interpretation of events is debatable as we shall see shortly. 
But the emotions experienced by the responsible State Department officers 
seem relatively clear: they were angry at the White House staff for mak-
ing them seem incompetent in the eyes of the President, who was still not 
blamed by State, and they felt that the White House staffers were amateurs, 
whose unprofessional conduct was clearly inferior to their own.
The reason why Hillenbrand’s account is not the correction of the record 
he would like it to be is connected to the third interesting point in Ken-
nedy’s 10 July memo to Bundy, which is the reasons for the delay and the 
emotional responses it engendered. Bundy followed the President’s instruc-
57 Martin J. Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time: Memoirs of a Diplomat (Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1998), 177. See also Rusk, As I Saw It, 222.
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tions and obtained a chronological report of everything that had happened 
with the American response to the Soviet aide-mémoire. He received the 
report from Frank Cash of Hillenbrand’s Office of German Affairs on 13 
July.59 Cash’s report, which has seemingly thus far remained unused by 
other scholars, is an interesting source that can illuminate both the rea-
sons for the delay and State’s feelings about White House involvement. The 
document began by stating that diplomacy was a long and arduous process, 
reminiscent in subject of Bohlen’s attempts at convincing JFK of the same, 
but Cash’s style was clearly condescending. His timeline referred to the 
Ralph Dungan-case, but by no means as the central time-consuming factor. 
Because while the Dungan faux pas had set back White House clearance 
of the response, it did not stop the inter-Allied consultation with the United 
Kingdom, France and West Germany – sending messages back and forth, 
conducting meetings and ironing out the details – which continued unabat-
edly in both June and July, and which took up most of the time. 
The fact that it was State’s adherence to the legalistic and traditionalistic 
approach, i.e. the process of inter-Allied consultation, and not the Ralph 
Dungan-affair that was the major cause of the delay, seems to represent a 
smoking gun – which it might actually have done to the White House. But 
to seasoned State Department officers, this process was so natural that it 
would have been incomprehensible to them had it not been there, which 
means that to them, White House action was the problem.
The State Department clearly felt that the White House’s involvement 
was meddlesome and that State’s approach was clearly superior. It also 
seems as if feelings were hurt and a need for retaliation arose. The fact that 
Bundy’s request – on behalf of the President – was answered by Cash, a 
mid-level Foreign Service officer in Hillenbrand’s office, and not Hillen-
brand himself, or the responsible Assistant Secretary, Foy Kohler, seems 
to indicate a deliberate slight from a department intent on adhering to pro-
tocol. 
Both State’s hurt feelings and the feelings of superiority (and accusa-
tions of inferiority) from both the White House and State came into play 
about a week before Kennedy’s 10 July memo to Bundy. Apparently dispar-
aged by a 30 June draft response from State, Kennedy had directed speech 
writer and Special Counsel Ted Sorensen to make significant alterations to 
59 Cash to Bundy, “Chronology of Preparation of US Reply to Soviet Aide-Mémoire of 4 June”, 13 July, 
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the draft and send them to the State Department for comments.60 Sorensen 
complied and sent of a memorandum to Secretary Rusk on 3 July in which 
he essentially broke up the American response into several parts. He seems 
to have done this to emphasize a point: the primary audience for the en-
tire response to the aide-mémoire was not necessarily the Soviet govern-
ment, but rather shapers of world opinion. The White House was aiming at 
a “wide circulation”, Sorensen wrote. The White House was also looking 
to perhaps take the entire Berlin issue before the International Court of 
Justice, because it felt that State’s draft lacked any “positive proposals” that 
could move the matter forward and in which Kennedy and the United States 
could be seen as actively engaging with the issue.61
Sorensen’s revised draft was not viewed favorably at State. Rusk com-
plained about Sorensen’s attempt at “filling it with flowery language that 
read like an inaugural address but was totally unacceptable for a diplomatic 
note. This led to further delays as the exciting adverbs and purple prose 
were toned down.”62 In his memoirs, Hillenbrand agreed with Rusk and 
added that the “inexperienced White House staffers obviously could not 
distinguish between formal diplomatic communication intended for the his-
torical record and a political speech.”63
The very fact that Kennedy asked Sorensen to redraft the response and 
that Sorensen sent a message to Rusk about the need for general improve-
ments and the inclusion of “positive proposals”, seem to indicate a low 
regard for State’s professionalism and a clear feeling of superiority. Rusk’s 
reaction to some extent mirrored the White House’s: he too held Sorensen’s 
abilities (concerning the writing of diplomatic correspondence) in poor es-
teem and felt that State’s approach – honed through many years of pro-
fessionalization – was clearly superior. He did not agree with the White 
House’s idea for “wide circulation” of the draft response that would allow 
it to play a more political role.
The entire matter of the American response to the Soviet aide-mémoire 
shows that the emotional and cognitive sides of the brain interact: a dis-
agreement over the right course of action, grounded partly in different tradi-
tions and approaches, led to a clash of emotions. But the emotional aspect 
60 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 65.
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also helped cause the disagreement in the first place, because had each side 
held the other in higher esteem, a compromise might have been found. As 
it happened, no such compromise emerged and in the end, the White House 
gave up its resistance, though Sorensen’s introduction was used as a cover-
ing note when it was finally sent on 18 July.64 The State Department might 
have won the battle, but it lost the war, because this incident – which the 
White House found tedious and minor – reinforced the perception of Ken-
nedy and his inner circle that the State Department was incapable of partici-
pating in policy decisions. Consequently, the White House – and especially 
McGeorge Bundy and the NSC staff – took over primary responsibility 
policy-making during the Berlin Crisis.65
Conclusion
When Deputy National Security Advisor Walt Rostow left his White House 
post to become Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff at State in Novem-
ber of 1961, he likened it to leaving “my comfortable and cheerful parish 
church in Rome to become a bishop – or something – in the provinces…”66 
Rostow’s farewell salute underscores the extent to which the White House 
had eclipsed the State Department in Kennedy’s New Frontier; Rostow’s 
move to State (beyond some friction with Bundy and Kennedy) under-
scores the extent to which the White House still found it necessary to “fix” 
the State Department. Kennedy’s expectations of the Department’s role in 
foreign policy-making – disappointed through 1961 – continued full stop.
This article has examined the emotional relationship between the White 
House and the State Department represented by key actors, such as Presi-
dent Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy and Ted Sorensen on the White House 
side; and Dean Rusk, Martin Hillenbrand and Charles Bohlen on the State 
Department side. The analysis has shown that both institutions came to the 
relationship with expectations that were – by and large – met with disap-
pointment. The White House wanted leadership from the State Department, 
64 The State Department copy in the National Archives does not include Sorensen’s cover note, cf. “U.S. 
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but only to the extent that it followed a pre-set framework. The State De-
partment, which had gone through a rough patch in the 1950s with suc-
cessive attacks from Joseph McCarthy and the far right and even its own 
Secretary, John Foster Dulles, was ill-geared to assume a leadership role 
from day one. It also did not agree with all of the central tenets of the White 
House framework, such as the requirement for urgency and constant in-
novation.
Both institutions felt comfortable and superior in their own professional-
ism and had a tendency to perceive the other side as inferior. Along with the 
disappointed expectations, these feelings engendered the clash of emotions 
that occurred in June and July of 1961 concerning the American response 
to the Soviet aide-mémoire given to Kennedy by Khrushchev in Vienna. 
Responsibility for answering this particular diplomatic communication was 
given to the State Department, but it quickly became obvious that where 
the President and the White House expected a political approach - using the 
American response to regain the initiative in the brewing Berlin Crisis after 
the Vienna Summit - the Department delivered a legalistic and diplomatic 
approach, which, although natural to State, was completely disappointing 
to the White House.
Accusations of amateurism were hurled from each side as both institu-
tions proclaimed their feelings of superiority over the other. In the case of 
the State Department, its feeling of superiority also masked a resentment 
and hurt feelings that the President and the White House did not have suf-
ficient faith in the Department’s abilities. Having won the battle over which 
version of the American response to send as a reply to the Soviets, the 
State Department felt vindicated in its professionalism. It was, however, a 
Pyrrhic victory as the White House used this as an opportunity to assume 
control of Berlin policy and thus leaving State very little of substance to 
show for its efforts.
This article shows that emotions are an important category of analysis 
in the history of American foreign relations, because they can nuance our 
findings and open new doors of inquiry. As with any analytical framework, 
emotions do not offer a mono-causal catch-all explanation, but they can 
open our eyes to motivations and relationships between historical actors 
that in the end prove vital to our understanding of the past.
